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A Dualistic Panpsychism 
Panpsychism is motivated by the view that biological processes in the brain cannot generate a radically 
new fundamental ingredient to the universe.  Evolution can only work with the ingredients and physical 
processes it has available to it.  Therefore qualities such as colors, sounds, feelings, and smells could not 
have been invented by the brain for the first time ever but must have already existed as real elements in 
our universe.  Evolution did not miraculously create new physical laws or substances but merely used 
existing psychophysical bridge laws to generate those phenomenal qualities.   
By the same principle the brain could not have created new subjective private worlds that bind those 
qualities into wholes.  The universe must have already consisted of such private perspectives or points 
of view.  There is no conceivable way that any future objective physics can allow for the creation of 
private subjective worlds with boundaries and limits out of a single smoothly connected objective world 
without any hard boundaries.  These private mental perspectives of subjects must be fundamental as 
well.   
Berkeley pointed out that a universe in which there are no sense qualities is an abstraction that cannot 
be imagined.  Similarly he thought the objective world cannot be imagined except from particular 
perspectives.  And so he takes the radical step of discarding the external public world.  Panpsychists take 
the less radical step of putting sense qualities and private mental worlds with their own unique 
perspectives of those sense qualities back into the physical world at an elementary level.   
How can the brain create consciousness, which it obviously appears to do, while at the same time 
enabling a purpose to consciousness?  Why would the brain generate a show of colors and sounds and 
feelings if not for the benefit of an independent entity that can do something about it?  By separating 
the generation of sense qualities from the minds that perceive them we can enable these two otherwise 
contradictory concepts, the generation of sentience and the efficacy of it, to simultaneously be true.   
1. The symphony of electrical impulses in the brain can generate mental qualities as science shows 
us.  For instance there is a visual processing center that can produce the color qualities of a 
visual field and this production is one-way and epiphenomenal.  This can happen because the 
brain evolved to make use of existing psychophysical laws that connect certain primary 
movements of matter to the secondary creation of phenomenal sense qualities.  In this way the 
brain produces the sense qualities that are the content of consciousness.  Note that the content 
of consciousness is ephemeral matching the ephemeral symphony of nerve impulses.  When I 
step outside into the fresh air my whole world changes in an instant. 
2. But there is something that is continuous and unchanging in spite of the total abrupt changes of 
that transition of experience out into the fresh air.  The conscious subject that experiences those 
qualia as a spatial and temporal whole is not generated by those second to second nerve 
impulses and exists via another physical mechanism.  Panpsychism can help us here.  
Subjectivity is part of the flow of the living process and splits off from already conscious nerve 
cell(s) during the process of brain development to become what Leibniz called “the dominant 
monad” which because it is a fundamental atomic element in the universe, and not the end-
product of the second to second nerve impulses, has causal efficacy.  Of course this is just a 
form of Cartesian dualism, but one grounded in the panpsychists continuous natural flow of 
conscious living evolution, rather than the miraculous. 
The private subjective worlds are fundamentals with causal powers.  These fundamental mental beings 
exist at least at the level of elementary particles, eukaryotic cells and animals with nervous systems.  
The elementary physical point particles, what Russell in his Outline of Philosophy called “emanations 
from a locality-the sort of influences that characterize haunted rooms in ghost stories”, are intrinsically 
subjective points of view.   These physical mysterious ghostlike centers are the same kind of things as 
those other invisible ghostlike centers: “other minds”; things that have no extension and cannot be 
directly seen but are inferred from their effects. 
 
In this panpsychist metaphysical model there is a fundamental circle.  The relative movements of these 
subjective points of view deterministically, via psychophysical laws, generate the phenomenal qualities 
which all subjects in the neighborhood can then perceive and respond to according to their natures by 
making new movements which then produce new qualities. 
 
The Failure of Emergence 
I will begin this discussion with a quote from the philosopher John Searle from his The Rediscovery of 
the Mind: 
“This conception of causal emergence, call it "emergent 1," has to be distinguished from a much more 
adventurous conception, call it "emergent2." A feature F is emergent2 if F is emergent 1 and F has causal 
powers that cannot be explained by the causal interactions of a, b, c...If consciousness were emergent 2, 
then consciousness could cause things that could not be explained by the causal behaviour of the 
neurons. The naive idea here is that consciousness gets squirted out by the behaviour of the neurons in 
the brain, but once it has been squirted out, it then has a life of its own. [...O]n my view consciousness is 
emergent1, but not emergent2. In fact, I cannot think of anything that is emergent2, and it seems 
unlikely that we will be able to find any features that are emergent2, because the existence of any such 
features would seem to violate even the weakest principle of the transitivity of causation” 
Emergent2 (a strong emergence) is for the same reason impossible to me.  If the nerve impulse in the 
brain are responsible for the generation of the conscious subject and also sustain it and produce 
everything about it, then how can the conscious subject still have its own real power to decide anything 
on its own, as it is totally under control of the physical forces producing it?  Emergence2 is incoherent 
and should be ruled out. 
The problem is that emergence1 (weak emergence) is also fatally flawed.  We may describe it as follows: 
Let a be the inputs to the brain, b be the computational processing of the brain, c be the output of the 
brain and X is the conscious mind.  X is the product of b.  In order to preserve the closure of the physical 
so that no mind stuff can interfere with the known physical processes, there is a one way relationship: x 
is the epiphenomenal byproduct of b but cannot influence b.  There is no escaping it.  In emergence1 
there cannot be an effect of the purely mental on the purely physical for that would break physical 
closure.  So when I say I see the color red my actual experiencing redness doesn’t count.  It is only the 
nerve cells (which are blind) that produce the output that says that I see red.  It is merely the result of 
blind computation and not the real conscious me saying it.  Thus our very own direct evidence that we 
report what we are experiencing must be discarded so that we can preserve closure.  Throwing away 
evidence to preserve the scientific theory of closure seems quite unscientific.  The argument from 
physicalism is that we suffer from an illusion for only blind nerve cells can really make things happen in a 
physically closed world.  Ignoring experiential evidence (even if it is private) to preserve a theory is a 
serious problem. 
There are still more problems with emergence.    Any deterministic theory in which a private subjective 
world pops into existence is doomed to fail for the same reason that if I claim that “when I waive my 
arms a flock of angels flies off” will fail.  For other minds, like my angels, are invisible.  We cannot 
directly see the seer and emergence1 claims that the invisible subject is an epiphenomenon with no 
unique effects of its own.  Because we cannot see the private conscious world of the subject directly we 
need to be able to see it indirectly through its effects.  But if it is epiphenomenal it has no effects.  How 
can we measure the effect of anything which by definition is entirely the product of nervous impulses 
and has no power of its own?   When I say the c-fibre caused me to feel pain it is not really me feeling 
pain that causes the verbal report for the response is already there in the pattern of nerve firings that 
only generates me as a side effect.  So no theory of a deterministic creation of a private conscious 
observer can ever be tested unless the observer has causal efficacy.  But that is not possible as long as 
the observer is entirely the byproduct of nerve signals.  Such a theory like my angels can never have any 
scientific or practical significance for an invisible ghostlike entity (the mind) that produces no distinct 
effects of its own can never be tested or measured or proven.  So the most dominant theory in science 
on the production of consciousness is unscientific.  It is not only not falsifiable, it is untestable, because 
according to the theory the stimulation of the nerve fibers only generates reports of what I experience 
and the reports are not coming from me but from neural computations that have no need of me.  Like 
my angels, as there is neither direct nor indirect evidence, it cannot be tested at all.  Emergence2 is 
logically incoherent and emergence1 has no practical consequences and no way to ever choose from 
one emergence theory over another.   From K. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of 
Scientific Knowledge: “The criterion of the scientific status of a theory is its falsifiability, or refutability, or 
testability”.  Ironically the dominant scientific theories of consciousness, because they attempt to 
preserve the closure of microphysicalism, fail the Popper test, and are therefore pseudoscience. 
Panpsychism can save this situation but most panpsychists fall into the same problem by preserving the 
closure of the physical.  They propose that the constituents of the subjective mind experience 
phenomenal qualities.  Let’s say for instance, that the neurons are not blind.  Let’s say when I see the 
color red some of the neurons are actually seeing red.  And perhaps the neurons see red because the 
electrons inside them see red.  Constitutive panpsychism then says that the parts see red and have real 
efficacy and then add up to a mental whole which is me that sees red within a larger context.  This 
theory gets us closer at least as the parts are conscious but how do they add up to me?  This is the 
combination problem.  A neuron may see red but I am seeing a whole picture of which red is just one 
part.  I am driving a car.  I feel my foot on the brake as the light turns red.  It is the whole unity of my 
subjective being that must have causal efficacy as I see the red traffic light simultaneously with the 
experience of driving the car and feeling my foot on the brake.  Without that we are still in the same 
place wondering how an invisible emergent mental being can produce any effects that can be tested 
and are not illusionary.  Therefore, a constitutive panpsychism that aims to be totally compatible with 
the closure of existing physical theory is of no help in combatting the failure of emergence.    
Perhaps we have been too faithful to physical closure.  If within the brain a(input) can cause changes to 
b(processing) which causes changes to c(output) there is no need at all for X(mind) and no theory of X 
that can have practical consequences.  But now suppose that b only causes certain effects in X so that it 
experiences phenomenal qualities and is aware of what is going on around it.  But X, the conscious 
individual self, is not created by b, which only creates the content that X observes.  Then X may have a 
real unique causal influence through a downward causation.   X, because it is a fundamental being and 
not a mere byproduct would then have some power of its own to feed back to b.  After all, does it make 
any sense for the majority of brain processing (b) to generate a virtual reality show filled with colors and 
sounds with pleasures and pains if not for the benefit of an independent entity (X) that can make its own 
decisions based on what it experiences?  Yes, it is a kind of interactive dualism, but grounded within a 
naturalistic framework based on panpsychism. 
The whole point of panpsychism is to provide an alternative to the radical emergence of a new essence, 
the subjective self, me, out of physical processes which bare no hint of anything like the private 
subjective world of phenomenal qualities that I am.   Panpsychism then should provide for continuity, a 
historical path for a conscious entity to evolve from simpler conscious entities that are fundamental to 
our world. 
In Leibnizian terms the conscious self is the dominant monad in the body.  Perhaps it is a single nerve 
cell or during development branched out of a single nerve cell’s mind or then maybe fused with the 
minds of a group of nerve cells to become the dominant monad.  Then the private point of view that is 
me had already existed as a seedling within the flow of life and was not generated abruptly from the 
ongoing nerve impulses (as the qualia are).  The self was never created.  It doesn’t pop in and out of 
existence de novo, but has a stability that evolved from the union of egg and sperm which themselves 
had inner natures that fused.   Said Lucretius:  “nothing comes from nothing”.  A basic principle at the 
heart of our scientific outlook is belief in conservation, continuity and gradual evolution over abrupt 
miraculous creation.  As elementary subjective points of view with some causal efficacy we are at least 
equal to the elementary particles in that we can both exert a force, and going far back in time we must 
have evolved from those elementary beings. 
 Quantum Physics and Teleology 
The elementary particles of physics and the conscious agents of the biological world are of the same 
type.  They are the fundamental points of view for observing the world from particular locations.  But 
they are also causally efficacious self-movers who are not just pushed around but initiate activity.  That 
activity is oriented towards specific goals.   Because they can observe their surroundings they receive 
feedback and can act in flexible ways to achieve their ends.   
Any practical theory that hopes to identify where in the natural world consciousness exists, must then 
attribute to it some observable effects.  Said William James in The Principles of Psychology (Vol 1) :  
“pursuance of future ends and the choice of means for their attainment, are thus the mark and criterion 
of the presence of mentality.”    
Each point of view or monad has its own nature that encapsulates its goals.  For living biological 
creatures like us that nature is flexible and can change, learn and grow.  Individuality and variety are the 
hallmarks of conscious biological beings.  The fundamental particles of physics, however, are conformist 
stable conservatives.  That does not necessarily mean they have no sentience, as the Jamesian test for 
the presence of mentality is not flexibility of goals but flexibility in achieving goals.  For the 
microphysical fundamental individuals the goals may be highly conserved. 
For instance, the pointlike particles that dynamically create atomic and molecular structure may be 
consciously drawn to an attractor; an ideal state.  In quantum physics the behavior of each individual 
particle is only known probabilistically but over time millions of events can sum up to a highly 
predictable structure.  Physicists don’t know why it works this way.  Teleology provides an explanation.  
If the individuals are all unique but share a common basic ideal end state, the end state will emerge over 
time.  Think of a bunch of painters painting a wall.  They can all start from anywhere; top, bottom, left or 
right.  But as long as they can perceive the state of the project and share in the goal they will ultimately 
progress towards a predictable ideal end:  the solidly painted finished wall with no holidays.   Mentality 
at the physical level may then allow for freedom of action of micro individuals achieving an ideal end 
state which in itself is frozen and predictable. 
